In 1972 Shapley and Shubik introduced assignment games associated to finite assignment problems in which two types of agents were involved and they proved that these games have a non-empty core. In this paper we look at the situation where the set of one type is infinite and investigate when the core of the associated game is non-empty. Two infinite programming problems arise here, which we tackle with the aid of finite approximations. We prove that there is no duality gap and we show that the core of the corresponding game is non-empty. Finally, the existence of optimal assignments is discussed.
Introduction
Nowadays many markets and transactions are bilateral, so 'two-sided' market models have become widely used in economic theory.
Since 1972, when Shapley and Shubik ( [9] ) introduced finite assignment games, much work related to these games has been developed. We point out the book of Roth and Sotomayor ( [7] ) as an important monograph on two-sided matching. Curiel ( [1] ) provides a thorough analysis of assignment games. In their work, Shapley and Shubik proved that the core of an assignment game is the non-empty set of solutions of the dual problem corresponding to the assignment problem. In ( [8] ), Sasaki gives axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment games. Some generalizations and extensions of these models are presented in Kaneko and Wooders ([5] , [6] ).
In this paper, we look at semi-infinite assignment problems where the number of one of the two types of agents involved is finite and the other is countable infinite and we prove that semi-infinite bounded assignment games are balanced. Recently, Fragnelli et al. ( [2] ) and Timmer et al. ( [11] ) have studied some kinds of semi-infinite balanced games arising from different linear programming situations, where one of the factors involved in the problem is countable infinite but the number of players is finite. However, here we tackle semi-infinite assignment games with the aid of some tools that are related to Tijs ([10] ). This paper consists of four sections. In the next section we present the most relevant definitions and results for the assignment problem with two finite sets of agents. We extend these problems in section 3 to semi-infinite bounded assignment problems where one of the sets of agents is countable infinite and the set of values of matched pairs of agents is upper bounded. We show that the corresponding primal and dual program have no duality gap and that there exist optimal solutions to the dual program, which is equivalent to the non-emptiness of the core of the corresponding game. Finally, in section 4 we introduce the critical number and the existence of optimal assignments is discussed.
Finite Assignment Problems
An assignment problem describes a situation in which there are two types of agents, for example, sellers and buyers or firms and workers. Denote by M and W respectively these two finite and disjoint sets of agents. Let m be the number of agents in M, i.e., m = |M|, and n = |W |. Assume without loss of generality that m ≤ n. When agent i ∈ M is matched to agent j ∈ W then this gives the couple a value of a ij ≥ 0. An assignment problem is thus described by the triple (M, W, A) with A = [a ij ] i∈M,j∈W .
The maximal total value of paired agents, where each agent i ∈ M is coupled to at most one agent j ∈ W and vice versa, can be determined by the following linear program.
(1)
The assignment matrix X ∈ {0, 1} M ×W , X = [x ij ] i∈M,j∈W , corresponds to the situation in which the agents i ∈ M and j ∈ W are matched if and only if x ij = 1. We will distinguish between two types of assignments or matchings. An M-assignment is an injective function π : M ′ → W, where M ′ ⊂ M, and a W -assignment is an injective function σ :
Given an assignment problem (M, W, A), the corresponding assignment game (N, w) is a game with player set N = M ∪ W . Let S ⊂ N be a coalition of players. Then the worth w(S) is defined to be the maximal value this coalition can obtain by matching its members.
Since we assumed that m ≤ n, it holds that
An optimal matching is a complete M-assignment such that i∈M a iπ(i) ≥ i∈M a iπ ′ (i) for all complete M-assignments π ′ . Let O p (A) be the set of these optimal matchings.
The vector (u, v), u ∈ R M + and v ∈ R W + , is called a feasible payoff for the assignment problem (M, W, A) if there is a complete M-assignment π such that i∈M u i + j∈W v j = i∈M a iπ(i) . In this case, we say ((u, v), π) is a feasible outcome and it is stable if (u, v) is an element of the core C(w) of the corresponding assignment game, where
If (u, v) ∈ C(w) is proposed as payoff to the players, then each coalition S ⊂ N gets at least as much as it can obtain on its own since i∈M S u i + j∈W S v j ≥ w(S). Thus no coalition has an incentive to break up with the grand coalition N. The following lemma by Roth and Sotomayor ( [7] ) tells something more about stable outcomes. This result implies that at a stable outcome, the only utility transfers occur between agents in M and W who are matched to each other. It also shows that those players who remain unmatched in some optimal solution receive a zero payoff.
Lemma 2.1 (Roth and Sotomayor
It is well known that if we replace the integer condition x ij ∈ {0, 1} in the linear program (1) by x ij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ M, j ∈ W , then all the optimal solutions will still have x ij ∈ {0, 1}. Thus the dual problem (D) equals
Because the primal problem has a solution, we know that also (D) must have a solution and the fundamental duality theorem asserts that these programs attain the same value. We denote by O d (A) and R d (A) the set of optimal dual solutions and the set of feasible dual solutions, respectively. By definition of w(S) it holds that if (u, v) is an optimal solution of the dual program then i∈M S u i + j∈W S v j ≥ w(S) for any coalition S, which ensures that this coalition cannot improve by splitting off from N when (u, v) is proposed as payoff. The following theorem says that these conditions are exactly the conditions that determine the core of an assignment game.
Theorem 2.2 (Shapley and Shubik) Let (M, W, A) be an assignment problem. Then the core of the corresponding assignment game is the non-empty set of solutions of the dual LP for the grand coalition
Moreover, if π is an optimal assignment then ((u, v), π) is a stable outcome for all coreelements (u, v). Vice versa, if ((u, v), π) is a stable outcome then π is an optimal assignment (see [7] for the proofs). So, we can concentrate on the payoffs to the agents rather than on the underlying assignment. Then the maximization problem of N = M ∪ W equals
One of the optimal solutions is: x 12 = x 21 = 1 and x ij = 0 otherwise. Thus the third agent of W is not matched. The corresponding optimal assignment π : M → W is: π(1) = 2 and π(2) = 1 and the value of this program equals
The dual problem reads
One of the dual solutions is:
It is easy to check that (1, 1, 0, 1, 0) is a core-element of the corresponding 5-person assignment game. Note that since agent 3 ∈ W is not matched, he should receive v 3 = 0.
Let (M, W, A) be an assignment problem and let j ∈ W . By B i (j, A) we denote the set of agents in W \ {j} who are at least as good as j for agent i ∈ M, so,
The following proposition tells us that an agent j ∈ W gets zero in each core-element if for each i ∈ M there are at least m (weakly) better agents in W than j.
Proposition 2.4 Let (M, W, A) be an assignment problem and let
where the last equality follows from π(i * ) = j. Thus v j ≤ 0 and since v j ≥ 0 by the dual program we conclude that v j = 0.2
Semi-Infinite Bounded Assignment Problems
In this section we introduce semi-infinite bounded assignment problems (M, W, A), where M = {1, 2, ..., m}, a finite set, W = N, the countable infinite set of natural numbers, and 0 ≤ a ij ≤ b for some b ∈ R, for all i ∈ M, j ∈ W . We analyze the corresponding semiinfinite bounded assignment games by finite approximation matrices A n ∈ R m×n where A n = [a ij ] i∈M,j=1,2,...,n , and by means of the so-called hard-choice number of the matrix A, to be introduced later. Since m < ∞ we will talk, from now on, about assignments instead of (complete) M-assignments.
We start by defining two types of agents in M. An agent i ∈ M is of type 1 if this agent can choose one-by-one m best elements j ∈ N with respect to the largest reward a ij . We denote by M 1 the set of agents of type 1. If i ∈ M \ M 1 then the agent is of type 2 and M 2 denotes the set of all these agents.
The choice set C i of an agent i of type 2 is the set of all his chosen best elements in W . Since this agent cannot choose m best elements (otherwise he is of type 1), we have 0 ≤ |C i | < m. The choice set C i of an agent i ∈ M 1 consists of those m agents in W obtained in m steps by taking in each step that agent j ∈ W not yet chosen by him and which gives him the maximal value a ij over all non-chosen j ∈ W . In case there are more agents j ∈ W that give the same maximal value a ij then we choose that agent j with the smallest ranking number. The following example illustrates these concepts. . . .
Agent 1 ∈ M attains his maximal value of 3 if he is assigned to agent 1 ∈ W . The second largest value he can obtain is a 12 = 2 and a 13 = 1 is the third largest value he can get. This agent has no problems with choosing his three best agents from W and therefore he is of type 1. His choice set thus equals C 1 = {1, 2, 3}.
The largest value that agent 2 ∈ M can attain is a 22 = 1. However, there is no second largest value because a 2n reaches the value 1 from below when n goes to infinity. This agent can only choose one best agent from W and therefore he is of type 2. His choice set equals C 2 = {2}.
Finally, agent 3 ∈ M has an easy job, since for all j ∈ W he gets the value a 3j = 1. All agents in W are best elements for him. We will choose those three agents with the smallest ranking number, thus C 3 = {1, 2, 3}. This agent is of type 1. We conclude that M 1 = {1, 3} and M 2 = {2}.
We will now introduce the hard-choice number.
Definition 3.2
The hard-choice number n * (A) is the smallest number in N∪ {0} such that
Lemma 3.3 Let (M, W, A) be a semi-infinite bounded assignment problem. If j > n
.., n * (A)}| ≥ |C i | = m and we define n i (j) = j. If i ∈ M 2 then |C i | < m and there are an infinite number of agents in W \ {1, 2, ..., n * (A)} strictly better than j. So, for n sufficiently large, say n i (j) ≥ j, there are (at least) m agents in {1, 2, ..., n i (j)} better than j. Take n(j)
Remark 3.4 From lemma 3.3 and from proposition 2.4 it follows that for all j > n * (A) and for each
The games corresponding to these semi-infinite bounded assignment problems are defined as follows. The player set N = M ∪ W consists of an infinite number of players. The value of coalition S, w(S), equals 0 if S ⊂ M or S ⊂ W and
otherwise. Just as in the previous section, the value w(N) = v p (A) of the grand coalition N can be determined by the linear program (1), replacing the maximum by the supremum since the set W is countable infinite. The following problem is the dual when we replace the integer condition by nonnegativity in the primal problem.
Notice that both the primal and the dual program have an infinite number of variables and an infinite number of restrictions. In general, ∞ × ∞-programs show a gap between the optimal primal and dual value. There is a large literature on the existence or absence of so-called duality gaps in (semi-)infinite programs. See e.g. the books by Glashoff and Gustafson ( [3] ) and Goberna and López ([4] ). Our goal is to prove that here the primal and the dual problem have the same value and that there exist optimal solutions of the dual problem. We achieve this result in some steps starting with a limit process in the finite space R m × R n * , where for the sake of brevity we will write n * instead of n * (A) in a subscript or a superscript.
We take for each n ∈ N with n > n * (A), an element (
Then we remove all coordinates of v n with index larger than n * (A) and obtain (u n , s
and similarly we get v n j ≤ sup{a ij |i ∈ M, j ∈ N}.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that lim n→∞ (u n , s n * (v n )) exists (otherwise take a subsequence) and we denote this limit by (u, v) ∈ R m × R n * . With the aid of (u, v) we construct the vector ( u, v) ∈ R m ×R ∞ by taking u = u and v = α n * (v), where
. So, v is obtained from v by adding an infinite number of zeros. Later we will see that ( u, v) is a core-element of the corresponding semi-infinite bounded assignment game but we start with showing that ( u, v) is feasible in the dual problem.
Lemma 3.5 Let (M, W, A) be a semi-infinite bounded assignment problem and let
Proof. By definition of ( u, v) it holds that all its coordinates are non-negative. Furthermore,
for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} it follows by taking the limit for n → ∞ that u i + v j ≥ a ij . So ( u, v) is a feasible solution of the dual problem.2
The next three lemmas deal with the relations between the values of the finite subproblems and the infinite problems and with weak duality.
We construct ( u, v) as we did before and so it follows that
.., n} in the finite problem is also feasible in the infinite problem. Furthermore,
For the converse inequality, take ε > 0 and a matching π
and therefore
Now we formulate the main result in this section, which tells us that there is no duality gap and that the set of optimal dual solutions is non-empty.
Theorem 3.9 Let (M, W, A) be a semi-infinite bounded assignment problem. Then
Proof. First, we prove that there is no duality gap using the fact that finite problems have no duality gap. From lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 follows,
It follows from the proof of lemma 3.6 and the first part of this proof that
Since O d (A) equals the core of the corresponding assignment game, it follows from this theorem that semi-infinite bounded assignment games have a non-empty core.
The Critical Number and Related Concepts
In this section, we present the critical number of a semi-infinite bounded assignment game. It turns out to be a key concept because, as we will show, it is related to the hard-choice number, introduced in section 3, and to the finite approximations. 
First, we present some results for finite critical numbers. The next proposition shows a relation between the hard-choice number and the critical number.
Proposition 4.2 Let (M, W, A) be a semi-infinite bounded assignment problem. If c(
Thus there is a j ∈ C i such that j = π(i) for all i ∈ M 1 . If we redefine π(i) = j then the matching remains optimal and agent i restricts his choice to C i .
For i ∈ M 2 there is no optimal matching π with π(i) / ∈ C i . This follows immediately from the definition of C i . We conclude that π ∈ O p (A) but also π ∈ O p (A n * ). Thus c(A) ≤ n * (A).2
As the next example shows, an optimal assignment can use agents j ∈ W for which j > n * (A). ...
We have seen in example 3.1 that C 1 = {1, 2, 3}, C 2 = {2}, C 3 = {1, 2, 3}, M 1 = {1, 3} and M 2 = {2}. Also, n * (A) = 3, v p (A) = 5 and each π k , with k ≥ 3, defined by π k (1) = 1, π k (2) = 2, π k (3) = k, is optimal. For k > 3 we have optimal matchings with π k (3) / ∈ C 3 , but the assignment π 3 is optimal and uses only elements in A n * . So, c(A) = n * (A) = 3.
The next example shows that we may have c(A) < n * (A). Then C 1 = {1, 2}, C 2 = {1, 3}, n * (A) = 3 and v p (A) = 3. An optimal assignment is π(1) = 2 and π(2) = 1 and so c(A) = 2 < 3 = n * (A).
In the next theorem we characterize the structure of the sets of optimal primal and dual solutions when the critical number is finite.
Theorem 4.5 Let (M, W, A) be a semi-infinite bounded assignment problem. If c(
Then, it follows from remark 3.4 that v j = 0 for j > n * (A). So, for n > n * (A) we have (u, s n (v)) ∈ O d (A n ) and (u, v) ∈ α n (O d (A n )). Conversely, take an element in α n (O d (A n )) for all n ≥ n * (A). Then it is of the form (u, α n (v)) where (α n (v)) j = 0 for all j > n * (A). For n = n * (A) there exists an optimal assignment π. This π is also optimal in A because v p (A) = v p (A n ). On the other hand,
In case c(A) = ∞, we construct an auxiliary matrix H corresponding to the matrix A. This m × (n * (A) + |M 2 |)-matrix H is defined by H = [A n * T ] where for each i ∈ M 2 we have a column t i e i in T with t i = sup{a ij | j ∈ N \ C i } and e i k = 1 if k = i and e i k = 0 otherwise. We will show that there are no optimal assignments if c(A) = ∞, but v p (A) and ε-optimal assignments can be obtained with the corresponding auxiliary matrix H. We illustrate these facts in the next example. a ij * ≥ t i − ε/m and j * = π(i ′ ) for all i ′ = i and define π ε (i) = j * . This can be done such that all i ∈ M are matched to m different elements in W . Then Proof. Analyzing the proofs in section 3 and the construction of ( u, v), we conclude that ( u, v) ∈ L(A) since v j = 0 for all j > n * (A). Hence it may be clear that
